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WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT
THE HONORABLE DIANE S. SYKES
Introduction by Dean Joseph D. Kearney
Welcome to this year's Hallows Lecture at Marquette University Law School-
or at Marquette University, and close to the Law School. It is my privilege as Dean
of the Law School to introduce both the lecture and the speaker.
I wish to begin with the individual in whose memory this lecture stands. The
Honorable E. Harold Hallows served as a member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
from 1958 to 1974, concluding his tenure as ChiefJustice of the Court. These were
years in which the legal system faced profound challenges and changes. I am
referring not only to the larger societal changes, which are well known and
chronicled, but also to developments in legal doctrine. Important areas of the law,
including aspects of constitutional law, criminal procedure, and tort law, bore only
a dim resemblance at the end of this period to what had existed in 1958. Justice
Hallows played a significant role in these developments on the Wisconsin front.
But it would be incorrect to suggest that this judicial work was the extent of
Justice Hallows 's contribution to the Wisconsin legal system. For several decades
prior to his appointment to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Justice Hallows was
Professor Hallows at Marquette University Law School. A whole generation of
students took courses such as Equity from Professor Hallows. This was
accompanied throughout by both a successful private practice in Milwaukee and a
leadership role in the state bar and efforts to reorganize the judiciary. The career
of Justice Hallows, who attended Marquette University as an undergraduate and the
University of Chicago for law school, was distinguished by substantial contributions
to the bar, the academy, and the judiciary.
Over the past decade the Law School has held an annual Hallows Lecture in
the late Chief Justice's memory. We have brought to campus (and to Milwaukee)
such individuals as Judge Guido Calabresi, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Chief
Justice Shirley Abrahamson. This year's speaker is the Honorable Diane Sykes, of
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Judge Sykes is well
known to this community and scarcely needs elaborate introduction, but permit me
to say a few words nonetheless. If they are brief it is both because I am not the
feature here and because I used up all my best lines at Judge Sykes's most recent
investiture.
Diane Sykes is a native of Milwaukee, a graduate of Northwestern University
with a journalism degree, and a Marquette lawyer, Class of 1984. After clerking on
the federal district court for one year and working in private practice for seven
years, she became Judge Sykes in 1992, by winning a contested election for a seat
on the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. Judge Sykes served in this position until
1999, when the Governor of Wisconsin appointed her to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, a position to which the voters of the State then elected her in 2000 to a full
term. Now-Justice Sykes was forceful and influential during this tenure. The Court
was closely divided on a number of matters-many of them in the same areas as I
mentioned with respect to Justice Hallows's tenure: constitutional law, criminal
procedure, and tort law. These areas of the law will always be with us (and a good
thing for the legal profession, I should hasten to add). I would not wish to suggest
that Justice Sykes 's position always prevailed, still less that she and Justice Hallows
would have made much common cause had they served on the Court together. But
none would doubt the significance of Justice Sykes's work on the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.
In 2004, Justice Sykes became Judge Sykes again, after the United States
Senate confirmed the President's nomination of her to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Judge Sykes is an increasingly national figure,
frequently called upon to speak across the country, but she remembers her alma
mater as well, including through the important work of permitting law school
interns each semester in her chambers. We are very grateful that today, once again,
she is with us at Marquette, as this year's Hallows Lecturer. Please welcome the
Honorable Diane S. Sykes.
Thank you. I am honored to present this year's Hallows Lecture. It is
always a pleasure to visit my law school, and the invitation to deliver this
particular lecture is indeed a privilege. The late Chief Justice Hallows taught
a generation of Marquette law students and served the people of Wisconsin
with great distinction as a Justice and Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court. We share a connection to both Marquette Law School and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, and, by coincidence of history, were both
appointed to the court by governors named Thom(p)son.
It seems fitting, then, that my topic this afternoon should be the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, given that Chief Justice Hallows and I have service on that
court in common, although of course my tenure was much shorter. I had the
honor of serving as a Wisconsin Supreme Court justice for five years. The
cases the court decides are diverse, compelling, and very important to the
people of this state. The Justices and Chief Justice are highly accomplished
jurists and dedicated public servants, committed to the work of the court and
the quality of justice delivered in Wisconsin's courtrooms. Although
consensus was sometimes difficult and our disagreements could be sharp, I
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thoroughly enjoyed my time on the court and respect and value the friendship
of each of my colleagues.
My focus today, however, will not be on the court during my tenure but
the court's 2004-2005 term, which was, by any measure, a watershed. In a
series of landmark decisions, the court:
* rewrote the rational basis test for evaluating challenges to state
statutes under the Wisconsin Constitution, striking down the
statutory limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
cases; 1
" eliminated the individual causation requirement for tort liability in
lawsuits against manufacturers of lead-paint pigment, expanding
"risk contribution" theory, a form of collective industry liability; 2
* expanded the scope of the exclusionary rule under the state
constitution to require suppression of physical evidence obtained
as a result of law enforcement's failure to administer Miranda
warnings;
3
* declared a common police identification procedure inherently
suggestive and the resulting identification evidence generally
inadmissible in criminal prosecutions under the state
constitution's due process clause; 4 and
• invoked the court's supervisory authority over the state court
system to impose a new rule on law enforcement that all juvenile
custodial interrogations be electronically recorded.5
The importance of these decisions can scarcely be overstated. Considered
individually, each represents a significant change in the law, worthy of close
analytical attention from the bench, bar, and legal scholars. Together, these
five cases mark a dramatic shift in the court's jurisprudence, departing from
some familiar and long-accepted principles that normally operate as
constraints on the court's use of its power: the presumption that statutes are
constitutional, judicial deference to legislative policy choices, respect for
precedent and authoritative sources of legal interpretation, and the prudential
institutional caution that counsels against imposing broad-brush judicial
solutions to difficult social problems. I will concede (as I must) that a court of
last resort has the power to throw off these constraints, revise the rules of
1. Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440.
2. Thomas v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523.
3. State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899.
4. State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.
5. In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110.
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decision, and set the law on a new course. But when it does so, we ought to
sit up and take notice, and question whether that power has been exercised
judiciously.
And yet there has been surprisingly little published commentary from the
Wisconsin legal community about the groundbreaking developments of the
court's last term. 6  This lack of critical analysis-pro or con-does a
disservice to the orderly development of the law, which depends in no small
part upon the active engagement of the bar and the legal academy in
evaluating the work of precedent-writing courts. So, in the spirit of sparking a
debate, my purpose this afternoon is to identify the prominent themes in the
most important cases of the court's last term and consider what those cases
might tell us about the court's current view of the proper uses of its power.
This is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of the reasoning, rhetoric,
or results of these cases, but a broader look at the interpretive philosophy and
judicial behavior that characterize the court's most recent work.
In Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,7 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court invalidated the statutory limitation on noneconomic damages
in medical malpractice cases. The damages cap was enacted as part of a
broad legislative initiative to address a developing medical malpractice crisis
in Wisconsin. The original 1975 law established a comprehensive patients'
compensation system, including mandatory health care provider insurance and
a patients' compensation fund that guarantees full coverage of all economic
damages for medical malpractice while limiting recovery of noneconomic
damages for less quantifiable harms, such as pain and suffering. The
legislature made explicit and detailed findings when it adopted the system,
citing the effects of rising malpractice judgments and settlements on the cost
and availability of medical liability insurance, health care costs, and the
practice of medicine in Wisconsin. Recovery of economic damages was
unlimited under the statutory system and guaranteed by the patients'
compensation fund; only noneconomic damages were subject to the statutory
cap. The noneconomic damages cap at issue in Ferdon was set in 1995 at
$350,000 and adjusted annually for inflation; by 2005, when Ferdon was
decided, the inflation-adjusted cap was just under $450,000.
The plaintiff in Ferdon asserted a broad-spectrum challenge to the
damages cap under the Wisconsin Constitution, arguing that it denied equal
protection, trial by jury, right to a remedy, and due process, and also that it
6. One notable exception is the following: Hon. Michael B. Brennan, Op-Ed, Are Courts
Becoming Too Activist? Wisconsin's Supreme Court Has Shown a Worrisome Turn in That
Direction, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Oct. 2, 2005, at 1J.
7. 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440.
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violated separation of powers principles. The court took up only the equal
protection challenge. In a decision spanning more than 100 pages of the
official reports-188 paragraphs, 248 footnotes, six separate Roman-
numbered sections (one further subdivided into four lettered subsections), plus
a "roadmap" for navigating the opinion (helpfully provided in the
introduction)-the court struck down the statutory damages cap.
Just a year earlier the court had rejected a similar equal protection
challenge to the statutory cap applicable to noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice wrongful death cases in Maurin v. Hall.8 The majority in Ferdon
began its analysis by dismissing the Maurin precedent as irrelevant, reasoning
that medical malpractice injury cases are less likely to arouse jury passion
than medical malpractice death cases. Why this difference should justify
completely disregarding a recent and closely analogous precedent is not
explained.
Moving on, the Ferdon majority recites the standard presumption that
statutes are constitutional, but does not apply it; pronounces the usual rule of
judicial deference to legislative acts, but does not defer; and settles on rational
basis scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review, but redefines the standard
upward so that it effectively functions as a heightened or intermediate level of
scrutiny. Before Ferdon, legislative acts not implicating a fundamental right
or creating a racial or other suspect classification received ordinary rational
basis review; in other words, a statute would survive an equal protection
challenge unless shown to be "patently arbitrary" with "no rational
relationship to a legitimate government interest." 9 This test is deliberately
hard to flunk, to guard against the judiciary's substitution of its own policy
preferences for those of the legislature. Equal protection does not require that
all statutes treat all persons identically, only that differences in treatment be
rationally related to the legislative goals underlying the statute.
Not any longer. With Ferdon, Wisconsin has a new rational basis test,
referred to variously by the court as rational basis "with teeth," rational basis
"with bite," and "meaningful rational basis."' 10 What this terminology means
as a legal matter is not entirely clear, but the new standard plainly calls for
more probing judicial inquiry into the relationship between legislative means
and ends than ordinary rational basis review. Apparently, the point of the
redefined standard is to authorize the court to make a policy-laden value
judgment about the tendency of a statute to effectively achieve its objectives,
and invalidate the statute if the court believes that tendency to be insufficient
8. 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866.
9. Id. 106, 274 Wis. 2d at 75, 682 N.W.2d at 890 (quotations omitted).
10. Ferdon, 2005 WI 125, 78, 80, 284 Wis. 2d at 613-15, 701 N.W.2d at 460-61.
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to justify the statutory classification.
That the court felt it necessary to rewrite the longstanding law of rational
basis review is telling; the implication is that ordinary rational basis scrutiny
would not produce the result the majority wanted to reach. The reconstituted
rational basis test-what Justice Prosser in dissent calls the rational basis
"makeover""1-permits the Ferdon majority to declare the damages cap
unconstitutional. It takes the court seventy-nine paragraphs to get there (you
would think if a law were truly irrational, it would be simpler to explain why);
those seventy-nine paragraphs are chock-full of citations of state and national
studies on the relative effectiveness of damages caps in reducing malpractice
insurance rates and health care costs, protecting the financial viability of the
patients' compensation fund, and ensuring quality health care. Justice Prosser
(joined in dissent by Justices Wilcox and Roggensack) criticizes the
majority's use of these studies as selective and misleading and provides a
lengthy analysis of existing empirical support for the damages cap.
What is readily apparent from all the back-and-forth about what the
studies do or do not show is that the court's majority is making a political
policy judgment, not a legal one. Fundamental to separation of powers is the
principle that it is the prerogative of the legislative branch to evaluate the
effectiveness of statutory solutions to social problems, and to decide whether
the inevitable trade-offs are acceptable and the allocation of economic
burdens and benefits are appropriate to the circumstances. The court's
responsibility of judicial review is not a warrant to displace legislative
judgments. It remains to be seen whether the court will apply its new,
souped-up iteration of rational basis review to all future equal protection
challenges or only some and, if the latter, how it will go about deciding which
statutes qualify for heightened Ferdon scrutiny. Either way, Ferdon
represents a major departure from long-accepted constitutional principles that
operate to maintain the balance of power between the legislative and judicial
branches.
Now let us move to Thomas v. Mallett, 12 the court's most consequential
common law decision of the last term. In Thomas, the court extended "risk
contribution" theory to the lead-paint industry, allowing a childhood lead-
paint claim to go forward to trial against lead-pigment manufacturers despite
the plaintiffs inability to identify which manufacturers caused his injury.
Steven Thomas lived in different Milwaukee homes during the early 1990s
and sustained lead poisoning by ingesting paint from paint chips, flakes, and
dust in the homes. He received settlements from two landlords and pursued
11. Id. 214, 284 Wis. 2d at 684, 701 N.W.2d at 495 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
12. Thomas v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523.
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claims against seven lead-paint pigment manufacturers-conceding, however,
that he could not causally link any specific manufacturer to his injury.
A basic premise of our tort liability system has been the requirement that a
plaintiff prove that the defendant was at fault and caused his injury before
liability attaches. Over time the fault requirement has been relaxed, perhaps
most notably in the development of strict products liability theory. The
causation requirement, however, has generally been maintained as a
fundamental feature of our liability law; new doctrines adjusting or
eliminating proof of cause in fact have not been widely accepted. Against this
backdrop, the trial court dismissed Thomas's negligence and strict liability
claims against the pigment manufacturers based on the absence of proof of
causation, and the court of appeals affirmed.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, becoming the first court in the
nation to allow such a case to go forward. The court's decision in Thomas
eliminates the causation requirement in lead-paint cases in favor of a form of
collective liability based on mere participation in the lead-pigment industry.
More than twenty years earlier, in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 13 the court adopted
a form of collective industry liability for use in cases alleging injuries from in
utero exposure to the antimiscarriage drug diethylstilbestrol ("DES"). The
"risk contribution" theory recognized in Collins allowed liability on proof that
the defendant drug company produced or marketed DES, regardless of
whether the plaintiff could identify the drug company that caused her injury.
The burden was placed on each drug company to prove that it did not produce
or market DES during the time period the plaintiff was exposed or in the
relevant geographic marketplace. Liability would be apportioned among the
drug companies that could not exculpate themselves under this burden-
shifting formula on the basis of a nonexclusive list of factors, including
market share and the degree to which the company tested for and warned of
hazardous side effects.
The court in Collins reasoned that each drug company contributed to the
risk of harm to the general public and, therefore, the risk of injury to
individual plaintiffs; unless the court relieved the DES plaintiff of the burden
of proving causation, she would have no remedy for her injury. The court
concluded that each drug company "shares, in some measure, a degree of
culpability in producing or marketing" a drug with potentially harmful side
effects and that "as between the injured plaintiff and the possibly responsible
drug company, the drug company is in a better position to absorb the cost of
13. 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).
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the injury." 14
The form of risk contribution liability recognized in Collins was not pure
"market share" liability of the type that had been adopted a few years earlier
by the California Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.1 5 It was,
nonetheless, a substantial departure from traditional liability norms and, until
Thomas, had not been expanded in this state. In Thomas, the court was not
confronted with a plaintiff who would otherwise lack a remedy without the
ability to sue under risk contribution theory-remember that Thomas had
already received settlements from his landlords. But the court expanded risk
contribution liability anyway, authorizing the negligence and strict liability
claims to go forward without proof of causation.
As applied to the lead-paint industry, risk contribution theory is
substantially more difficult to administer than in DES cases and very likely
will function as a form of absolute liability, as Justices Wilcox and Prosser
noted in strongly worded dissents. In DES cases each drug company has at
least in theory a meaningful opportunity to defend against liability by proving
it did not produce or market the drug either where the plaintiff lived or during
the specific nine-month period she was exposed.
In lead-paint cases, in contrast, the opportunity for the defendant
manufacturers to exculpate themselves is almost nonexistent. The majority in
Thomas made it clear that the relevant time period for lead-paint risk
contribution liability is not the time period of the plaintiffs exposure but the
entire time period each house with lead paint existed. In Thomas, the lead
paint present in the three houses where the plaintiff lived could have been
applied at any time between 1900 and 1978 (the later date being when most
lead-based paint was banned). Apportioning risk contribution liability among
manufacturers of lead pigment based on market share and relative culpability
over an almost eight-decade period of time is nearly impossible as a purely
factual matter.
Apportionment of tort liability in a comparative fault regime is by nature
somewhat imprecise, but some imprecision is acceptable when the defendants
whose conduct is being compared have been proven to be causally at fault for
the plaintiff's injury. Apportionment of liability in a system that dispenses
with the requirement of individualized causation asks the jury to assess and
fix relative blame across an entire industry, not for the harm sustained by the
plaintiff who will recover but for generalized harm to the public at large.
14. Id. at 191-92, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
15. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924 (1980).
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This is, then, a form of collective tort liability untethered to any actual
responsibility for the specific harm asserted, imposed by the judiciary as a
matter of loss-distribution policy in response to an admittedly serious public
health problem. As Justice Wilcox observed in his dissent, "[t]he end result
of the majority opinion is that the defendants, lead pigment manufacturers,
can be held liable for a product they may or may not have produced, which
may or may not have caused the plaintiffs injuries, based on conduct that
may have occurred over 100 years ago when some of the defendants were not
even part of the relevant market."' 6 The majority's response: "[T]he problem
of lead poisoning from white lead carbonate is real; it is widespread; and it is
a public health catastrophe that is poised to linger for quite some time."17
The extension of risk contribution theory in Thomas may signal the
court's willingness to modify the causation requirement in other contexts. If
so, it will represent a major reordering of the purposes of our tort system from
adjudicating individual remedies for private civil wrongs to finding funding
sources to address broad public policy problems. True, the common law is all
about judicial policy judgments, but it develops best when developed
incrementally. The discretion of a common law court does not precisely
parallel the discretion of a legislature; differences in institutional constraints
and competence generally favor leaving the more sweeping proposals to alter
liability rules to the legislative branch of government. A court is limited to
the facts and arguments in the case before it; the public and nonparty
stakeholders have little say-little opportunity to participate and attempt to
influence the court's decision, as they would the legislature's. The court's
decision in Thomas may well turn out to be an isolated response to the
problem of lead-paint poisoning. If the opposite is true, and the court extends
risk contribution theory to other industries, the case will have substantial
implications for the stability and predictability of our liability system, and the
stability of the state's economy as well.
Now let us consider the court's 2004-2005 criminal docket. In State v.
Knapp,18 the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a new rule of state
constitutional law requiring suppression of physical evidence derived from the
failure of police to deliver Miranda warnings to a suspect in custody.
Matthew Knapp had been seen drinking with Resa Brunner a few hours before
she was found beaten to death with a baseball bat. Police investigating the
murder learned that Knapp was on parole, and because his consumption of
16. Thomas, 2005 WI 129, 177, 285 Wis. 2d at 328, 701 N.W.2d at 567-68 (Wilcox, J.,
dissenting).
17. Id. 133, 285 Wis. 2d at 307, 701 N.W.2d at 558.
18. 2005 WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899.
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alcohol was a violation of his terms of supervision, his parole officer ordered
an apprehension request. When police arrived at Knapp's apartment to arrest
him, they could see Knapp through the door and announced that they had a
warrant for his arrest. Knapp picked up a phone to call his attorney but then
hung up the phone and let the police in. An officer told Knapp he had to go to
the police station but deliberately did not deliver Miranda warnings at the
scene of the arrest. The officer followed Knapp as he went into his bedroom
to put on some shoes. In the bedroom the officer asked Knapp what he had
been wearing the prior evening, and Knapp pointed to some clothing on the
floor. The officer seized the clothing, which included a bloody sweatshirt;
DNA tests established that the blood on the sweatshirt was Resa Brunner's.
Knapp was charged with Brunner's murder, and his case was first before
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 2003 on an interlocutory appeal of the denial
of Knapp's motion to suppress the sweatshirt. The court ordered the
sweatshirt suppressed as the fruit of the officer's intentional withholding of
Miranda warnings. 19  Because the decision was premised on federal
constitutional law, the state petitioned for certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court.
In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
United States v. Patane,2 ° rejecting the very suppression argument the
Wisconsin Supreme Court had accepted in Knapp. The Supreme Court held
in Patane that a police officer's failure to provide the warnings required by
Miranda did not require suppression of nontestimonial physical evidence
derived from a defendant's unwarned but voluntary statements. The Court
explained that "[b]ecause the Miranda rule protects against violations of the
[Fifth Amendment's] Self-Incrimination Clause, which, in turn, is not
implicated by the introduction at trial of physical evidence resulting from
voluntary statements," the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine did not
apply. 2 1 In other words, the core constitutional right that Miranda was
designed to protect-the right against compulsory self-incrimination-simply
was not affected by the introduction of the nontestimonial physical fruits of
the failure to give Miranda warnings. As long as the defendant's unwarned
statements are excluded, as Miranda requires, application of the exclusionary
rule to derivative physical evidence-usually highly probative and reliable-
could not be justified by reference to any deterrence effect on law
enforcement related to the underlying constitutional right against compulsory
self-incrimination.
19. State v. Knapp, 2003 WI 121,265 Wis. 2d 278, 666 N.W.2d 881.
20. 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
21. Id. at 634.
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Following Patane, the United States Supreme Court summarily granted
certiorari in Knapp, vacated the Wisconsin court's decision, and remanded for
reconsideration in light of the decision in Patane.22  Although Matthew
Knapp had not based his earlier suppression arguments on the Wisconsin
Constitution, the Wisconsin Supreme Court directed further briefing in light
of the remand and took up the question of whether the state constitution's
self-incrimination clause required suppression even though the Fifth
Amendment to the federal constitution did not.
Before Knapp, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had repeatedly held that in
the absence of a meaningful difference in language, intent, or history, the state
constitution's Declaration of Rights should be interpreted in conformity with
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of parallel provisions in the
Bill of Rights. The language of the state constitutional right against
compulsory self-incrimination is virtually identical to the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment; the court had declined many previous
invitations to interpret the state right more expansively than its federal
counterpart.
Not this time. In round two of Knapp, the court accepted the defendant's
invitation to-as the court put it-"utilize ... the Wisconsin Constitution to
arrive at the same conclusion as in Knapp L" 23 This language is revealing for
its pure, unvarnished result-orientation. The court's decision rests not on the
language or history of the state constitution's self-incrimination clause but on
the court's own policy judgment flowing from an expansive view of the
deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule. The court reasoned that a police
officer's intentional withholding of Miranda warnings is "particularly
repugnant and requires deterrence" in order to prevent the judicial process
from being "systemically corrupted. 24
But the court made no effort to explain how the failure to comply with a
requirement imposed as a matter of federal constitutional law should give rise
to a more expansive exclusionary remedy under the state constitution than the
federal constitution. An answer, of sorts, is found in a concurrence by Justice
Crooks, joined by the other three members of the Knapp majority, making it
the majority's view. Justice Crooks explains that the court's decision "serves
to reaffirm Wisconsin's position in the 'new federalism' movement." 25 The
concurrence invokes United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan's
famous 1977 Harvard Law Review article encouraging state supreme courts to
22. Wisconsin v. Knapp, 542 U.S. 952 (2004) (per curiam).
23. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 56, 285 Wis. 2d at 112, 700 N.W.2d at 912.
24. Id. 75, 81, 285 Wis. 2d at 124, 129, 700 N.W.2d at 918, 921.
25. Id. 84, 285 Wis. 2d at 130, 700 N.W.2d at 922.
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continue the Warren Court's rights revolution under the auspices of state
constitutional interpretation.26 Justice Brennan called on state supreme courts
to "step into the breach" created by the emergence of a more conservative
United States Supreme Court.27 After almost thirty years of resisting the
temptation to answer Justice Brennan's call, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has finally succumbed.
The "new federalism" battle cry was sounded by the Wisconsin high court
more than once last term. In State v. Dubose,28 the court departed from the
longstanding reliability standard for due process challenges to eyewitness
identification evidence and fashioned a stricter rule of admissibility under the
Wisconsin Constitution. For many years the court followed the general
framework established by the United States Supreme Court in Manson v.
Brathwaite29 and Neil v. Biggers30 for determining the admissibility of
eyewitness identification evidence. Brathwaite and Biggers require an
evaluation of the suggestiveness of the identification procedure used by the
police as well as the reliability of the resulting identification. In Dubose the
court changed course and declared the police identification procedure known
as the "showup" to be inherently suggestive and generally inadmissible under
the state constitution's due process clause.
A "showup" is police nomenclature for a common out-of-court
identification procedure in which a suspect is presented one-on-one to a crime
victim or eyewitness, usually soon after and at or near the scene of the crime.
The United States Supreme Court subjects showup identifications to the same
test for suggestiveness and reliability as any other police identification
procedure; until Dubose, the Wisconsin Supreme Court followed suit. The
showup procedures at issue in Dubose included a one-on-one presentation of
an armed robbery suspect to the victim at the scene within minutes of the
crime, and a one-on-one presentation of the suspect to the victim through a
two-way mirror at the police station shortly thereafter.
To justify abandoning reliability as the touchstone for admissibility, the
Dubose court cited what it referred to as "extensive studies on the issue of
identification evidence" and broadly asserted that "[t]hese studies confirm that
eyewitness testimony is often 'hopelessly unreliable.' 31 Invoking this "new
26. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977).
27. Id. at 503.
28. 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699N.W.2d 582.
29. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
30. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
31. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 29-30, 285 Wis. 2d at 162-63, 699 N.W.2d at 591-92.
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information," the court declared itself convinced that showups "presen[t]
serious problems in Wisconsin criminal law cases. ' 32 On the basis of these
undifferentiated "serious problems"-not problems specific to the facts of the
case but "problems" generally-the court concluded that showup
identifications are "inherently suggestive and will not be admissible unless,
based on the totality of the circumstances, the procedure was necessary. 33
The court cautioned, however, that a showup will not be deemed "necessary"
unless the police lack probable cause for an arrest or, "as a result of other
",34
exigent circumstances, could not have conducted a lineup or photo array.
The majority opinion in Dubose holds that the due process clause of the
Wisconsin Constitution "necessitates" this new approach to eyewitness
identification evidence but makes no effort to explain why.35 Instead, the
opinion simply invokes "new federalism" and the court's power to interpret
the state constitution to "provide greater protections than its federal
counterpart., 36  In other words, the existence of the power justifies its
exercise. Again, Justices Wilcox, Prosser, and Roggensack dissented (as they
had in Knapp), not disputing the court's premise-that it has the power and
the duty to interpret the state constitution-but questioning its method for
doing so. Justice Wilcox was especially troubled by the court's departure
from well-established precedent on the basis of data from social science
studies presented by advocacy groups. "Not only is such data disputed," he
said, "but, more importantly, it is not a valid basis to determine the meaning
of our constitution. The majority fails to adequately explain how the meaning
of the text of the constitution can change every time a new series of social
science 'studies' is presented to the court. If the text is so fluid, then our
constitution is no constitution at all, merely a device to be invoked whenever
four members of this court wish to change the law." 37 To this the majority
had no response.
And, finally, in In re Jerrell C.J., 38 the Wisconsin Supreme Court invoked
its supervisory authority over the state court system to adopt a rule requiring
law enforcement to electronically record all custodial interrogations of
juveniles "without exception when questioning occurs at a place of detention"
and "where feasible" when questioning occurs elsewhere.39 Jerrell involved a
32. Id. 29, 32, 285 Wis. 2d at 162, 164, 699 N.W.2d at 591, 592-93.
33. Id. 33, 285 Wis. 2d at 166, 699 N.W.2d at 594.
34. Id. 45, 285 Wis. 2d at 177, 699 N.W.2d at 599.
35. Id. 39, 285 Wis. 2d at 172, 699 N.W.2d at 597.
36. Id. 41, 285 Wis. 2d at 173-74, 699 N.W.2d at 597.
37. Id. 65, 285 Wis. 2d at 185-86, 699 N.W.2d at 603-04 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
38. 2005 WI 105, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110.
39. Id. 58, 283 Wis. 2d at 172, 699 N.W.2d at 123.
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custodial interrogation of a fourteen-year-old armed robbery suspect. The
court held the juvenile's confession involuntary based on his age, intelligence,
and experience; the five-hour duration of the interrogation; and the officers'
use of a "strong voice" to accuse the juvenile suspect of lying, which
"frightened" him. 40 Normally, throwing out the confession would have ended
the court's review. But the majority went on to announce an electronic-
recording requirement for custodial juvenile interrogations. The majority
articulated several policy justifications for the new rule: to enhance the
accuracy and reliability of juvenile interrogations, to reduce the number of
disputes over Miranda and voluntariness, to protect law enforcement officers
wrongly accused of improper tactics, and to protect the rights of the accused.
These justifications are uncontroversial as matters of policy; that the court
resorted to its supervisory power for the authority to impose the new rule was
extraordinary and unprecedented. The Wisconsin Constitution vests the
Supreme Court with "superintending and administrative authority over all
courts.' Never before has the superintending power been interpreted so
expansively-in essence, to permit the court to reach beyond supervision of
the court system to regulate the practices and procedures of another branch of
government. The majority attempted to characterize its decision as merely
controlling "the flow of evidence in state courts, 42 but by this interpretation
the court's superintending power is almost limitless.
Again, Justices Prosser and Roggensack dissented, joined by Justice
Wilcox. The dissenters did not take issue with the benefits of tape-recorded
interrogations but objected to the majority's assumption that the court has the
power to regulate police -conduct that violates neither the constitution nor a
statute. Justice Prosser decried the extreme breadth of the majority's view of
the court's power: "If the majority opinion represents a proper use of the
court's 'superintending . . . authority,' then, logically, there is no practical
reason why the court could not dictate any aspect of police investigative
procedure that is designed to secure evidence for use at trial. The people of
Wisconsin have never bestowed this kind of power on the Wisconsin Supreme
Court."
4 3
There is much more that could be said about these cases, but by now some
common themes should be evident. The first is that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court is quite vigorously asserting itself against the other branches of state
government. When the court decides cases on the basis of the state
40. Id. 1 35, 283 Wis. 2d at 163, 699 N.W.2d at 119.
41. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
42. Jerrell, 2005 WI 105, 49, 283 Wis. 2d at 168, 699 N.W.2d at 121.
43. Id. 155, 283 Wis. 2d at 220, 699 N.W.2d at 147 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
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constitution, its power is at its peak, because legislative correction is
impossible and the constitution is difficult to amend. Three of these five cases
involved interpretations of the Wisconsin Constitution, and a fourth, Jerrell,
represents an extraordinary expansion of the court's constitutional
superintending power. The terms "modesty" and "restraint"-the watchwords
of today's judicial mainstream-seem to be missing from the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's current vocabulary. Instead, the court has adopted a more
aggressive approach to judging.
A related phenomenon is the court's apparent strong preference for its
own judgment over that of either the Wisconsin Legislature or the United
States Supreme Court. Only one of the decisions discussed today is capable
of being modified by the state legislature, and none can be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. The present Wisconsin Supreme Court is plainly disinclined
to defer to the judgment of those elected to represent the people of this state,
even though the structure of state government and the court's precedents
require it to do so. The court has lowered the threshold for invalidating
statutes by adopting a heightened standard for evaluating their
constitutionality. The court is quite willing to devise and impose its own
solutions to what it perceives to be important public policy problems-civil
and criminal-rather than deferring to the political process.
The court has also manifested a cavalier, almost dismissive attitude
toward the sources of legal interpretation generally thought to be most
authoritative: the text, structure, and history of the constitution and laws, and
the court's own precedents. Despite their heft, most of the opinions discussed
today are notable for their failure to meaningfully engage in the usual analysis
of applicable legal texts and court precedents. Instead, longstanding legal
standards are rewritten or simply disregarded at will, either by reference to
less authoritative decisional resources-such as disputed social science
research-or simply the court's own subjective policy judgment and raw
power to render a binding statewide decision. Judges who are sensitive to
some limits on the scope of judicial authority and competence generally try to
confine themselves to authoritative and objective sources of interpretation-
the law's language, structure, logic, and history-and are skeptical of broad
appeals to the court's policy judgment. Among other things, this approach
has the virtue of constraining the judges to behave like judges rather than
legislators.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has enormous influence over the legal
order and the political, social, and economic future of this state. These cases
from the last term reflect a court quite willing to aggressively assert itself to
implement the statewide public policies it deems to be most desirable. The
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court is loosening the usual constraints on the use of its power, freeing itself
to move the law essentially as a legislature would, except that its decisions are
for the most part not susceptible of political correction as the legislature's
would be. Time will tell whether the court will continue the extraordinary
activism of its 2004-2005 term, will adjust its pace, or take a breather. In the
meantime-and this is true regardless of whether the trends of the last term
continue or abate-the court's work deserves closer attention from the legal
community and the public.
In closing, please allow me to emphasize that I offer these views not just
as a former member of the court but as one who has been privileged to serve
the Wisconsin legal system for more than twenty years as a lawyer in private
practice and as a trial and appellate court judge. I recognize that others-
perhaps many others-may disagree. But the court's work is so important to
the people of this state that I urge all-both those who might agree with me
and those who might not-to discuss and debate these issues. My thanks to
Marquette Law School for providing this forum and to all of you for your kind
attention this afternoon. 4
44. I would also like to thank Marquette law student Jeffrey R. Ruidl for his research assistance
on this lecture.
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